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FORCED TENANCIES AS TAKINGS OF PROPERTY IN
SEAWALL ASSOCIATES V. CITY OF NEW YORK:
EXPANDING ON LORETTO AND NOLLAN
INTRODUCTION
The takings clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution is deceptively
simple: "private property shall not be taken for a public use without just com-
pensation." 1 Traditionally, this clause has required courts in takings clause
suits to balance the public's interest in the land use regulation against the
individual's right to use her property as she sees fit.2 More recently, however,
the Supreme Court has disregarded a case-by-case balancing approach for cer-
tain types of takings cases while retaining it for others.
The Supreme Court established this dichotomy in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.' In Loretto, the Supreme Court held that a perma-
nent physical odcupation authorized by the government is per se compensable.4
In essence, Loretto carved an exception from the traditional rule that sub-
jected governmental regulations to a multifactor balancing test.5 This dichot-
omy created by Loretto between physical occupations and other types of gov-
ernmental regulations has created problems for courts. In particular, courts
have struggled in determining whether governmental regulations are "physi-
cal" or "regulatory" in nature.6 This characterization is important because
regulations deemed as physical will assuredly result in "just compensation" to
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment's takings clause applies to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
2. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (balancing prop-
erty owner's economic expectations in the property and economic harm to property against the
regulation's perceived benefit to "common good"). For commentary on all aspects of the takings
clause, see Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1581 (1988); Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause is Neither Weak
nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988); Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1988); Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667 (1988).
3. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
4. Id. at 432. The Loretto decision overturned the balancing approach that was previously used
for all intrusions, physical or regulatory and instead, held that "a permanent physical occupation
authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve." Id.
at 426.
5. Id.; see also infra note 29 (discussing balancing test's factors that are still relevant for regu-
latory intrusions); infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (same).
6. See infra notes 174-224 and accompanying text (discussing Seawall Assocs. v. City of New
York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500
(1989), and the court's inability to distinguish between a regulatory and physical regulation).
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the landowner. 7 A classification of the government restriction as regulatory,
however, may result in the property owner being unable to receive any com-
pensation at all. 8
In Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 9 the highest court of New York
considered whether a land use regulation was physical or regulatory in nature.
The regulation at issue in Seawall was New York City's Local Law No. 9,
which placed a five-year moratorium on the conversion, alteration, and demoli-
tion of single-room occupancy housing ("SRO")."0 This moratorium included
a corresponding requirement for owners to restore all SRO units and lease
them totenants at controlled rents." The Seawall court held that Local Law
No. 9 was unconstitutional because it constituted a physical occupation of the
landlord's properties, and thus, was per'se compensable under Loretto. 2 The
court, however, did not stop there. It further held, in the alternative, that even
if Local Law No. 9 was not a physical taking, it was, nevertheless, an imper-
missible regulatory intrusion.'
Seawall is important because it is one of the first cases that attempts to
interpret and apply the Supreme Court's recently adopted takings framework,
a framework which has been criticized by commentators as being convoluted
and inconsistent."' This Note traces the development of the law of takings,
with a particular emphasis on the distinctions between physical and regulatory
takings. The Note also examines the history of landlord-tenant regulations,
which have been traditionally upheld through the years, and explains how the
regulation in Seawall went beyond traditional infringement on landlords. The
Note then examines the facts and issues that the court addressed in Seawall
and contends that the case is an expansive interpretation of the Supreme
Court's takings precedents. This Note further suggests that Loretto has caused
confusing and artificial distinctions that have made coherent analysis difficult
in cases such as Seawall. Finally, the Note explains how Seawall represents
one of the first major cases to expand upon recent Supreme Court precedents
that provide landowners with more protection for substantive property rights.
7. See supra note 4; infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 5; infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
9. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500
(1989).
10. Id. at 100, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 106, 542 N.E.2d at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
13. Id.
14. See Kmiec, supra note 2, at 1630 (stating that the Supreme Court's recent cases have
revealed continuing instability in the area of takings law); Comment, The Supreme Court's Tril-
ogy of Regulatory Takings: Keystone, Glendale and Nollan, 38 DEPAUL L. REv. 441, 442-43
(1988) (stating that the Supreme Court's "less than definitive" treatment of the takings clause
has created much confusion).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Property Rights and Land Use Regulations
The Supreme Court has defined property rights as the rights "to possess, use
and dispose" of property. 15 These rights and other rights, such as the right to
modify and manage property, are often collectively referred to as an owner's
"bundle" of property rights.1" To protect these rights, courts have attempted
to balance competing interests by weighing the public benefit of a governmen-
tal regulation against the landowner's right to be free from overly intrusive
regulations.17
The government often enacts land use regulations that infringe on these
property rights in an attempt to further social policy. There are two ways in
which government can engage in such action. First, government can take pri-
vate property for public purposes, by exercising its power of eminent domain."8
Government, however, must pay for such appropriations.19 Second, govern-
ment can regulate land uses that may have a detrimental impact on society, by
exercising its police power.20 Governmental regulations, authorized by police
power, may be implemented without paying for such appropriations.2
The government's use of its police power has been a particularly important
vehicle in furthering social policy.2" Like governmental exercises of eminent
domain, acts falling under the police power are undertaken on behalf of soci-
ety and must further a legitimate public purpose.2" These two powers, eminent
domain, and police power, authorize government to infringe on personal prop-
15. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
16. See, e.g., Postema, Jurisprudence: Liberty in Equality's Empire, 73 IOWA L. REV. 55, 88
(1987) (stating that the concept of ownership is usually understood as a "bundle of rights of
command over some portion of the world, including rights of possession, use, management, aliena-
tion and compensation"); see also L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATION 19
(1977) (bundle includes the right to any income or profit generated by ownership, and the powers
to consume, waste, and modify the property).
17. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
18. Id. Eminent domain is defined as "[tihe power to take private property for public use by
the state, municipalities and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of
public character." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979). This power of eminent domain:
is founded in both the federal (Fifth Amend) and state constitutions. However, the
Constitution limits the power to takings for public purposes and prohibits the exercise
of the power of eminent domain without just compensation to the owners of the prop-
erty which is taken. The process of exercising the eminent domain power is often
referred to as "condemnation" . ...
Id.; see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (conditioning the use of
eminent domain power, which triggers just compensation, upon the existence of a public purpose).
19. See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (use of eminent domain triggers just compensation).
20. See Comment, supra note 14, at 442.
21. See id.; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (stating that a regulation, author-
ized by the government's police power, never constitutes a compensable taking).
22. See Comment, supra note 14, at 442. Most land use regulations are characterized as an
exercise of the government's police power. Id. at 450.
23. See id.
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erty rights.
Thus, it is clear that property rights are not absolute. They can be infringed
upon or limited, sometimes severely."' Zoning, as a valid exercise of the gov-
ernment's police power, is a prime example of a situation where a landowner is
not necessarily entitled to the highest and best use of her property.25 The high-
est and best use of the property is a hypothetical construct referring to the
amount that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller if the property were
sold on the open market.26 Zoning and other land use regulations typically
place a ceiling on the highest and best use by restricting the allowable uses of
land.27
Since it is undisputed that government can and will infringe upon property
rights, the critical question becomes how stringently property rights need to be
protected against various governmental intrusions. Governmental intrusions
that are severe enough to be held compensable are called "takings."" Al-
though the history of takings law is characterized not by explicit rules, but by
a balancing test that includes no set formula,29 courts have tended to be defer-
ential to government attempts to implement social policy.30 Thus, quite pre-
dictably, courts have upheld land use regulations supported by a legitimate
state interest.31 Further, courts have accepted a variety of interests as legiti-
24. See infra notes 156 & 158 (discussing cases which have required nearly a total loss of
economic value before finding a compensable taking).
25. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396-97 (1926) (upholding a prohibition on
industrial uses); see also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980) (upholding open space
zoning regulation that limited development to one single family residence per acre); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) (upholding New York Landmark Com-
mission's limitation on building rights of certain designated landmarks).
26. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389 (1926) (stating that highest and best use does not focus on the
property's present worth, but on its potential worth).
27. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980) (upholding open space zoning
regulation that limited development to one single family residence per acre); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) (upholding New York Landmark Commission's
limitation on building rights of certain designated landmarks); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926) (sustaining zoning law that caused 75% diminution in property's value).
28. See First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (holding that
governmental action that "works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the 'constitu-
tional obligation to pay just compensation' ") (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960)); see also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (for a definition of "taking").
29. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that courts nor-
mally engage in "ad hoc, factual inquiries" to determine whether just compensation is due when
the government imposes restrictions on property). This same Court, however, did articulate some
relevant factors which it deemed relevant for purposes of balancing: 1) the economic impact of the
government regulation on the landowner; 2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with
investment-backed expectations of the landowner; and 3) the character of the government action.
Id. at 124-29.
30. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. at 138 (sustaining a New York
law that required owners of landmarks to maintain property as landmark without compensation).
31. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926) (sustaining zoning
ordinance that restricted the location of businesses and housing and also regulated maximum lot
size and structure height); see also Michelman, supra note 2, at 1607 (stating that prior to Nol-
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mate, ranging from providing affordable housing for poor people 2 to the pro-
tection of endangered birds33
Future courts, however, may not follow this historically deferential ap-
proach. In 1987, the Supreme Court indicated in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commissions" that it would scrutinize land use regulations more closely than
it had in the past.3" The plaintiffs in Nollan owned a parcel of beachfront
property, which included a bungalow that had fallen into disrepair.36 The Nol-
lans sought to build a new structure on the property and applied for a coastal
development permit as required by the California Coastal Commission." The
Commission granted permission to the Nollans to rebuild a house on the
beachfront lot. 8 This permission was limited, however, by a condition that the
Nollans grant the public an easement to pass across their property. 3'
The Supreme Court held that the condition amounted to an impermissible
exaction of property,'0 thereby reversing the California Court of Appeal's de-
cision.41 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began his analysis by defining
a "permanent physical occupation" as occurring when individuals have "a per-
manent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
be continuously traversed .... ,'2 Nevertheless, the regulation in Nollan was
analyzed primarily as a nonphysical restriction.'3 Presumably, the Court chose
lan, the clear understanding was that land use laws would virtually never be struck down by the
Supreme Court for failure to have a rational relationship to a permitted government end).
32. See Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1988).
33. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1979). The extreme deference that the Court
gave to the regulations' ends in Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), and Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979), can be contrasted with the Court's heightened scrutiny of the means, exhibited in
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); cf. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 1649
(characterizing this aspect of the Nollan decision as a "landmark change of direction").
34. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
35. Id. at 834-37 & n.3 (applying an intermediate scrutiny test and rejecting the argument that
the traditional takings standard was the same as that applied to due process or equal protection
claims).
36. Id. at 827.
37. Id. at 828.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 839. An exaction is the "wrongful act of an officer or other person compelling the
payment of a fee or reward for his services, under color of his official authority, where no payment
is due." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (5th ed. 1979). According to the Nollan Court, the re-
questing of an easement was an exaction because the government had no rightful claim to use the
lateral property alongside the Nollan's house. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 832-33 (1987).
41. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986),
rev'd, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
42. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832.
43. See Kmiec, supra note 2, at 1650. The Supreme Court deliberately chose not to "go down
the Loretto path to invalidate the easement condition as an impermissible physical invasion." Id.
Justice Scalia does not seem to realize that looking at a multifactor balancing test or a means-
ends nexus is irrelevant in the presence of a physical invasion after Loretto. Id. For a discussion of
Justice Scalia's opinion, see Michelman, supra note 2, at 1609. Justice Scalia's opinion took great
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this analysis because the physical occupation in Nollan was the result of a
conditional granting of an easement designed to offset any burden created by
the new structure, and the Commission in Nollan could have refused to allow
the landowner to rebuild his property entirely.""
The majority struck down the Commission's action because granting the
easement did not "substantially advance" a legitimate state interest."' Ac-
cepting, for purposes of argument, the Commission's determination that pro-
tecting the public's ability to see the beach was a legitimate state interest, the
Court held that the public purpose of protecting visual access did not require,
or at least, was not substantially furthered by, the Nollans' granting lateral
access along their property to the beach.4"
The "rational nexus" test established in Nollan requires courts to examine
the relationship between the governmental ends to be served, and the means
established by local law to achieve that end. 47 If the means created by the land
use restriction are not closely related to the state's purported interest, the reg-
ulation may be struck down as "an out and out plan of extortion." 48 Although
Nollan's impact is far from clear, its newly created rational nexus test appears
to require a "semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory means-
pains to assert an analogy between Nollan and Loretto. Id. Oddly,. the Court's final reasoning,
however, does "not rest where it started, that is, with the Loretto analogy and permanent physical
occupation." Id.
44. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1609.
45. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). In creating the rational
nexus test, Justice Scalia cited language from prior decisions, which required a regulation to "sub-
stantially advance[] legitimate state interests," in order to be constitutional. Id. at 834 & n.3
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 253, 260 (1980)). Justice Scalia also concluded that a "use
restriction may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
government purpose." Id. at 834 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104,
127 (1978)); cf Alexander, Takings, Narratives and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1764
(1988) (the "sufficient nexus" test is the Supreme Court's response to what it perceives as govern-
mental manipulation and deceit. The state's access rationale, while itself a potentially legitimate
purpose, was in this particular case merely "a trick by which the Coastal Commission could
achieve an objective that it could not obtain directly without paying compensation-namely, ob-
taining a lateral public easement across the Nollan beachfront lot.").
46. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
47. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 2, at 1613 (stating that Justice Scalia's use of phrases
such as "substantially advances" and "reasonably necessary" indicate a heightened level of judi-
cial scrutiny). The Supreme Court has often used such language in different contexts to signal a
noncursory, intensified level of judicial scrutiny of asserted means-ends justification of state laws.
See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)
(using heightened scrutiny for commercial speech); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976)
(using heightened scrutiny for sex-based discrimination). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1553-1618 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the Court's use of intermediate scrutiny in
a variety of contexts).
48. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The Nollan Court analogized the conditional granting of an ease-
ment to a state's prohibition on yelling "fire" in a crowded movie theater, which the state would
waive if a party paid it $100, Id. The Court reasoned that although an outright prohibition on
such yelling would be valid, granting exemptions on this unconstitutional basis would change the
regulation's fundamental nature. Id.
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ends relationships." 49 This heightened scrutiny standard may be a sign that
the Supreme Court's newer members will provide more substantive protection
to property rights in the future."'
Courts that impose this heightened scrutiny on land use regulations hinder
the government's ability to implement social policy. By enacting land use regu-
lations, the government is often able to further social policies and force the
costs associated with those policies on a disproportionately small group of
landowners. 1 Commentators have criticized this imposition of disproportionate
costs as violative of the individual landowner's rights, and have contended that
the government should not solve public problems without imposing the solution
on the entire public."
These same commentators have struggled in determining the proper balance
between the owner's rights to her property and the government's right to im-
plement social policy. Professor Michelman suggests that there are four impor-
tant questions. that need to be asked when deciding if a landowner should be
entitled to compensation: 1) does the regulation result in a physical invasion to
the property? 2) how detrimental, qualitatively, is the harm that is inflicted on
the landowner? 3) what are the social gains when balanced against the private
losses? and 4) is the landowner being restricted from activities that are nor-
mally seen as not being harmful to others?6" Although recognizing each factor
as potentially relevant, Professor Michelman disputes that any one of these
factors, by itself, provides a workable test. 4
49. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1607-14; cf Alexander, supra note 45, at 1766 (acknowledg-
ing the remaining uncertainty of whether Nollan's nexus requirement will be applied only to mu-
nicipal exactions or whether its scope will be much broader, and recognizing that Nollan might be
limited solely to exactions that are "Loretto-like" physical invasions); Comment, supra note 14, at
479 (stating that recent Supreme Court precedents signify a shift from extreme deference toward
state and local regulations to one of increased protections for private property owners who are
seeking protection from intrusive regulations).
50. There is, however, much dispute among commentators on this point. See Kmiec, supra note
2, at 1648-50 (disputing Michelman's views and indicating that the ends-means requirement may,
in light of more creative regulations, be easily overcome, resulting in less substantive protection
for property rights).
51. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 139 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (believing that the majority impermissibly imposed the cost of retaining landmarks in
New York on the "owners of the individual properties" instead of on all New York taxpayers).
52. See, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1169 ("Shall the losses be left with
the individuals on whom they happen first to fall, or shall they be 'socialized'?"). Some of the
more conservative Supreme Court members also believe this disproportionate cost shifting to be
inappropriate. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138-48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding it
inappropriate to place the burden of preserving landmark properties in New York on individual
owners rather than all taxpayers).
53. Michelman, supra note 52, at 1184.
54. Id. Michelman further argues that the only acceptable approach is to determine compensa-
tion by applying a utilitarian test of fairness: whether it is fair to implement a social policy with-
out paying for the private loss that is inflicted in the process. Id. at 1171-72; cf infra notes 126-28
and accompanying text (criticizing the current test which makes a distinction between permanent
and temporary takings).
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B. Landlord-Tenant Statutes
Landlord-tenant law has been one particular area where the government has
imposed substantial regulations on landowners. The courts have typically sus-
tained such governmental action. The Supreme Court has held that traditional
landlord-tenant statutes are normally impervious to takings challenges and do
not usually rise to the level of a compensable taking.5" Further, the Supreme
Court has expressly upheld the concept of rent control as involving a valid
state interest which is imposed on landowners who choose to rent their proper-
ties.56 This deference to landlord-tenant statutes has led to wide latitude in
governmental regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Typical landlord-tenant laws that have been upheld in the past involved re-
strictions on "existing tenancies where the landlords had voluntarily put their
properties to use for residential housing." '57 In Loab Estates, Inc. v. Druhe,6
the local law in question barred the eviction of tenants unless provisions had
been made for their relocation. 59 Seeking to withdraw their properties from
the rental market, developers challenged the law as being a deprivation of
property without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment.6" The
court held that restrictions on a landlord's power were within the lawful scope
of the government's police power.6 ' Using a balancing test,62 the court held
that the legitimate governmental interest in protecting the tenants in posses-
sion justified a temporary restraint upon the rights of landlords to withdraw
their property from the rental market. 63 Although the law interfered with
landlords' ability to use their property at its highest and best use, the law did
not create a compensable taking.6 '
In addition to protecting tenants from eviction, the courts also have held
that the government can protect tenants from excessively high rents.6 5 In
55. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982) (acknowledg-
ing states' and municipalities' "broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the
landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries
that such regulation entails").
56. See. e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding rent control as valid state
interest).
57. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 105, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1064, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 548 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
58. 300 N.Y. 176, 90 N.E.2d 25 (1949).
59. Id. at 179, 90 N.E.2d at 27.
60. Id. at 179, 90 N.E.2d at 26.
61. Id. at 180, 90 N.E.2d at 27.
62. The particular factors of this balancing test were unclear at the time of Loab Estates, Inc.
v. Druhe, 300 N.Y. 176, 90 N.E.2d 25 (1949). The factors of this balancing test, however, were
later clarified in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See infra notes 152-
55 and accompanying text (discussing balancing factors).
63. Loab Estates, 300 N.Y. at 180, 90 N.E.2d at 27.
64. Id. In Loab Estates, the court noted that the landowners neither claimed that they were
deprived of a reasonable rate of return nor that an emergency existed. Id. Presumably, either of
these facts would have changed the analysis.
65. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
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Bowles v. Willingham,6" the regulation at issue set rent ceilings, establishing
maximum amounts above which landlords could not charge.6 7 The Supreme
Court upheld the rent control statute, although it noted that the statute in
question did not require "any person .. . to offer any accommodations for
rent."'6 8 In that sense, it is useful to separate traditional landlord-tenant law,
such as Bowles, from cases in which "the government authorize[d] the perma-
nent occupation of the landlord's property by a third party." 9 If the regula-
tion is merely a rent ceiling imposed on those who rent property, then the
regulation will most likely be sustained; 70 however, if a landowner is forced to
rent the property, then it will be seen as more intrusive than typical landlord-
tenant statutes and will likely be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny."
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on regulations forcing
landlords to offer accommodations for rent, Chief Justice Rehnquist has al-
ready said that a regulation preventing a landlord from demolishing a rent-
controlled apartment building would constitute a permanent physical occupa-
tion by the government, and therefore, a compensable taking.72
C. Takings
A "taking" is any type of "publicly inflicted private injury for which the
Constitution requires payment of compensation.1 73 A taking may be found
under two circumstances: 1) where the government, or its agent, creates a
permanent physical occupation of a landowner's property;7' or 2) where a
court finds, after applying a balancing test, that the interests of the private
landowner in unrestricted use of his property outweigh the public interest in
having the regulation implemented."
The source of the takings controversy is the fifth amendment to the United
66. Id.
67. Id. at 506-08.
68. Id. at 516-18. The court noted that the act in question was written during World War II.
Id. at 519. The court, therefore, suggested that if the country could demand the lives of its men
and women in waging the war, the country was not constitutionally required to provide a system
of price control that would assure each landowner a "fair return" on his property. Id.
69. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).
70. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (upholding rent ceiling); cf Loretto,
458 U.S. at 440 (distinguishing laws that cause permanent physical occupations, which are per se
compensable, from rent control regulations which trigger "multifactor inquiry generally applicable
to nonpossessory governmental activity").
71. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440 (holding regulations that "require the landlord to suffer the
physical occupation of a portion of his building by a third party" to trigger compensation).
72. Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875, 877 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of appeal).
73. Michelman, supra note 52, at 1165.
74. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982); cf.
Michelman, supra note 52, at 1184 (noting that traditional takings law was that "in the absence
of explicit expropriation, a compensable taking could occur only through physical encroachment
and occupation") (emphasis in original).
75. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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States Constitution, which guarantees that "private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation.1 76 Although the fifth
amendment's text appears straightforward on its face, courts have found it
difficult to elucidate the proper scope of the takings clause.
If a court holds a regulation to be a taking, the landowner is entitled to just
compensation for any property taken.7 It is clear, however, that not all gov-
ernmental regulations rise to the level of a taking.78 While all permanent phys-
ical occupations are per se compensable 79 nonphysical governmental regula-
tions are only potentially compensable.80 With respect to governmental
regulations that are not characterized as permanent physical occupations,
courts balance the public and private interests at stake.8 ' If the regulation
advances an important public interest and is not particularly intrusive on prop-
erty rights, then the regulation is likely to be sustained as falling within the
government's valid "police power." 8
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. Comment, supra note 14, at 464. Despite the unambiguous text of the fifth amendment's
just compensation clause, the Supreme Court has not always awarded landowners compensation
for the government's impermissible takings. In the past, a common remedial measure, after invali-
dating a regulation, was to undo the wrongful legislation and refuse monetary damages. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (finding a taking and enjoining the
enforcement of the regulation but not awarding compensatory damages); Davis v. Pima County,
121 Ariz. 343, 345, 590 P.2d 459, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (finding a taking yet determining
that the landowner was not entitled to monetary damages, but landowner was entitled to the
judicial remedy of undoing the wrongful legislation), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979). But see
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987)
(holding it "constitutionally insufficient" to withhold remedy of monetary damages for regulatory
taking). According to the First English Court, the body that created the taking is liable for all
losses incurred from the day the regulation took effect. Id.
The First English decision appears to have answered the question of whether states can with-
hold the remedy of monetary damages for regulatory takings. In First English, a winter flood in
Los Angeles destroyed the Glendale Church's camp for handicapped children. Id. at 307. The
City of Los Angeles proceeded to adopt flood plain regulations that forbade the church from
rebuilding its camp for an indefinite period of time. Id. The church sued for compensation for the
alleged taking. Id. at 308. The California courts denied that compensation was an available rem-
edy. Id. at 308-09. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that if a taking occurred,
the county owed monetary damages for the losses caused by the regulation from the day it took
effect. Id. at 314-22. The First English Court, however, did not touch upon the separate question
of what types of regulations qualify as takings.
78. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 50 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (ac-
knowledging that "not every governmental act which ultimately destroys property rights consti-
tutes a compensable taking of those rights").
79. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982).
80. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (acknowledging the use of
an ad hoc, factual balancing test involving several factors to determine if a taking arose); see also
infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing balancing test).
81. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
82. Traditionally, land use regulations were subject to only minimum scrutiny. This standard
has resulted in judicial deference to land use laws found to have a public purpose. See, e.g., Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-89 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinance that was neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary).
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1. Physical Takings
Originally, it was commonly held that a compensable taking could occur
only when government physically occupied or encroached on a landowner's
property.83 Today, the result of this doctrine is that courts, while sometimes
denying compensation for nontrespassory injuries, never deny compensation
for a physical occupation or encroachment.8"
The original physical invasion suits were agricultural cases. For instance, in
Pumpelly v.. Green Bay Co.,"8 the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that
governmental action could rise to the level of a physical taking.86 In Pumpelly,
a state-constructed dam flooded 640 acres of petitioner's property for a period
of six years.87 Petitioner's land was almost completely destroyed by the flood-
ing.88 The Supreme Court held that compensation was required, even though
the land's title had not been disturbed.88 The Court articulated the following
rule: "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of
water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure
placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking,
within the meaning of the Constitution . . .9'
A subsequent Supreme Court case, however, made the application of this
takings rule unclear. In Transportation Co. v. Chicago,81 the Court distin-
guished Pumpelly. The Transportation Co. Court held that the construction of
a needed temporary dam in a river, in order to allow construction of a tunnel,
was not a taking, despite the fact that the plaintiff landowner was denied ac-
cess to his properties. 2 The Court reasoned that, unlike the Pumpelly dam
which resulted in a permanent flooding, the obstruction in Transportation Co.
only impaired the property's use. 3 No compensable taking arose because "no
entry was made upon the plaintiff's lot.""' As demonstrated in Transportation
Co., the Supreme Court has struggled over the general causation question of
when government action becomes too intrusive; seemingly, the government's
action must directly cause the landowner's injury for a court to find a compen-
sable taking.95
A related question to what level of direct governmental action is necessary
to constitute a taking is, what type of governmental actions create physical, as
83. Michelman, supra note 52, at 1184.
84. Id.
85. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872).
86. Id. at 179-80.
87. Id. at 167.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 179.
90. Id. at 181.
91. 99 U.S. 635 (1879).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 642.
94. Id.
95. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing cases requiring "direct injury" in the
strict sense of the phrase).
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opposed to regulatory, takings. The Supreme Court decision in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States" explained which strands in an owner's bundle of property
rights are potentially subject to physical invasion. 7 The Kaiser Aetna Court
declared that "the right to exclude" 8 is "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." 9 In Kaiser
Aetna, the government imposed a navigational servitude which allowed public
access to a landowner's pond. 00 The Court held that the regulation resulted in
an actual physical invasion, in the form of an easement, across a privately
owned marina.' 0' The Supreme Court reasoned that, although the physical
invasion created "only an easement in the property," the government was re-
quired to pay just compensation because the granting of the easement severely
infringed upon the landowner's right to exclude others. 0 The Court, there-
fore, declared the imposition to be unconstitutional.
Historically, courts have found a physical taking only when there was a
relatively serious governmental intrusion on land. Therefore, until Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,'03 it was unclear whether physical in-
vasions, that could best be described as minor or trivial infringements on a
landowner's property rights, were also compensable. The Supreme Court re-
solved this question in Loretto when it explicitly adopted a per se rule that
physical takings were always compensable.'0 4
In Loretto, a New York statute required landlords to permit a cable televi-
sion company, CATV Corporation ("CATV"), to install its cable facilities
upon the landlord's property and accept payment of one dollar from the cable
company, which was the amount deemed reasonable by the state commis-
sion. 10 CATV proceeded to string television cable of less than one-half inch in
diameter, and approximately 30 feet in length, along the length of the building
about 18 inches above the rooftop.' CATV also installed two large boxes
along the roof cables.' 07
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute as a legitimate police
power regulation which served the purpose of eliminating landlord fees and
conditions that inhibit the development of cable television. 0 8 The New York
96. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
97. Id. at 179; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing "bundle of property
rights").
98. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179.
99. Id. at 176.
100. Id. at 175-80.
101. Id. at 180.
102. Id.
103. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
104. Id. at 426.
105. Id. at 423-24.
106. Id. at 421-22.
107. Id.
108. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 143-44, 423 N.E.2d
320, 329-30, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 852-53 (1981) (aiding the development of cable television is a
substantial government interest because it provides important educational and community bene-
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court expressly rejected the notion that a physical occupation authorized by
the government was always a compensable taking.1°9 The court reasoned that
the statute did not have any real economic impact on landlords and did not
interfere with any reasonable investment-backed expectations. " ' The Court of
Appeals concluded that the substantial public interest outweighed the interests
of the private landowner, and therefore, no compensable taking arose."'
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the New York court's
decision."' Although the placement of cable facilities upon a landlord's prop-
erty was a minor occupation of an owner's land," 3 a majority of the Supreme
Court adopted a per se rule to declare the statute a compensable taking.""
Speaking for six Justices, Justice Marshall held that the takings clause com-
pelled the conclusion that a permanent physical occupation authorized by the
government is a taking regardless of the public interests that it may serve.'' 5
The majority reasoned that "a physical intrusion by government [is] a prop-
erty restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings
Clause.""' 6 The majority further reasoned that the relevant case law had a
common thread of refusing to deny compensation for a permanent physical
occupation." 7 Therefore, the court declined the opportunity to allow for a de
minimis exception." 8 The majority rejected the notion of a de minimis excep-
tion, at least in part, because it believed that a landowner suffered a special
hardship when a stranger directly invaded and occupied the landowner's prop-
erty." 9 According to the Court, the uniqueness and severity of a permanent
physical occupation warranted a per se rule. 20 Applying its per se rule, the
Supreme Court declared that the installation of television cables constituted a
taking, even if the wires occupied insubstantial amounts of space and did not
seriously interfere with the owner's use and enjoyment of the property.'
fits), rev'd on other grounds, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
109. Id. at 146-48, 423 N.E.2d at 331-32, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54.
110. Id. at 150-51, 423 N.E.2d at 333-34, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 856-57.
Ill. Id. at 144-46, 423 N.E.2d at 330, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 852-54.
112. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
113. Id. at 443-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (labeling the taking involved here as clearly de
minimis).
114. Id. at 438-39.
115. Id. at 434-35.
116. Id. at 426.
117. Id. at 428; see, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (finding that
to be considered a taking, flooding must "constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land,
amounting to an appropriation of, and not merely an injury to, the property"); cf. Michelman,
supra note 52, at 1184 (noting that according to traditional takings law, "in the absence of ex-
plicit expropriation, a compensable taking could occur only through physical encroachment and
occupation") (emphasis in original).
118. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438-39 (1982).
119. Id. at 436. Historically, property law has protected an owner's expectation of undisturbed
possession of his property. Id. Requiring an owner to allow another to exercise complete dominion
over the property is directly at odds with this protection. Id.
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id. at 434-35 (finding that a taking occurs when the government action is a "permanent
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Realizing the potential ramifications of its holding, the Loretto Court distin-
guished permanent occupations from temporary occupations. A permanent
physical occupation constitutes a compensable taking, whereas "a more tempo-
rary invasion, or government action outside the owner's property that causes
consequential damages within" the property, does not necessarily constitute a
taking.122 Further, the Loretto Court was quick to distinguish the statute at
hand from rent control precedents. 12  The Court explicitly stated that its ar-
ticulated rule, that all permanent physical occupations are per se compensable,
did not affect "the government's power to adjust landlord-tenant
relationships.124
The Loretto dissent, written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justices
White and Brennan, strongly objected to the destruction of the balancing test
in favor of a per se rule."2 The dissenters also opposed the majority's pur-
ported talismanic distinction between physical intrusions and regulatory intru-
sions. '2  Further, Justice Blackmun objected to an artificial distinction be-
tween permanent occupations and mere "temporary physical invasions.' 27 He
asserted serious doubts as to whether such a distinction could be made, and if
so, whether it should be made. 2 8
physical occupation of property . . . without regard to whether the action achieves an important
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner").
122. Id. at 428; see also Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (holding that
flooding must "constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropria-
tion of, and not merely an injury to, the property" in order to rise to the level of a taking);
Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 225 (1904) (finding that damages that are incidentally
consequential to a government act, as opposed to damages that are the direct consequences of a
government act, are not compensable).
123. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).
124. Id. (acknowledging that the Court has consistently sanctioned states' and municipalities'
"broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in
particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails").
125. Id. at 446-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that because the extent to which "the
government may injure private interests now depends so little on whether or not it has authorized
a 'physical contact,' the Court has avoided per se takings rules resting on outmoded distinctions
between physical and nonphysical intrusions.").
126. Id.; see also Michelman, supra note 52, at 1227 (stating that a takings rule based on a
perceived distinction between physical and regulatory takings is inherently suspect because "its
capacity to distinguish, even crudely, between significant and insignificant losses is too puny to be
taken seriously").
127. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (objecting to the majority's approach which "reduces the constitutional issue to a for-
malistic quibble" over whether property has been "permanently occupied" or "temporarily in-
vaded"). Justice Blackmun began his criticism of the majority's temporal distinction by simply
asking "what does the court mean by 'permanent'?" Id. at 448. According to Justice Blackmun,
since all temporary limitations on the right to exclude are subject to the more complex balancing
test to determine whether they are a taking, the majority presumably held that the governmental
intrusion created by the statute in Loretto would last forever. Id. However, the majority conceded
that the intrusion in Loretto did not require the landowner to permit cable installation forever but
only so long as the property remained residential and a CATV company wished it to remain. Id.
The intrusion in Loretto, therefore, was "far from permanent." Id.
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2. Regulatory Takings
While permanent physical occupations have now been held to be per se
compensable, regulatory intrusions on landowners' rights are still potentially
constitutional. This is because regulatory intrusions are subject to a balancing
test instead of the per se rule that Loretto adopted for physical takings. 10
Justice Blackmun, in his Loretto dissent, explained that a paradox exists be-
tween physical and regulatory takings which has caused unfortunate inconsis-
tencies in takings clause jurisprudence.' Indeed, the dissent criticized the
current state of the law for causing this paradox. 1' Justice Blackmun noted
that intrusive governmental regulations that greatly diminish the value of
property are upheld; while, in contrast, de minimis physical occupations that
cause minor financial damage are routinely struck down pursuant Loretto.13 2
This paradox can be seen more easily by looking at regulatory takings
precedents.
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' the Supreme
Court established that a governmental regulation could constitute a compensa-
ble taking. 34 In Pennsylvania Coal, the regulation at issue was the Kohler
Act. This act prohibited coal mining "in such [a] way as to cause the subsi-
dence of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation
. . ,"135 A coal company that had retained the right to mine coal underneath
a landowner's house attacked the Kohler Act because it allegedly deprived the
coal company of its property rights and interfered with its freedom to con-
tract.1 36 Focusing primarily on the extensive loss in the value of the coal com-
pany's property rights, the Supreme Court applied a balancing test in striking
down the Kohler Act.137
The Pennsylvania Coal decision is known for the proposition that "the dis-
tinction between a regulation which constitutes an exercise of the police power
and a regulation which constitutes a taking is one of degree."' 38 Under Penn-
sylvania Coal, in order to determine whether a taking has occurred, the pri-
129. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing balancing test for nonperma-
nent physical regulations).
130. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 447 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. The dissent further argued that these regulatory intrusions often diminish the value of
private property "far more than minor physical touchings." Id. Justice Blackmun believed that the
government's ability to injure private interests depends very little on whether it has authorized a
"physical contact." Id; see also Michelman, supra note 2, at 1226-29 (stating that a takings rule
based on distinctions between physical and nonphysical intrusions is inherently suspect).
133. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
134. Id. at 414-16. The early history of the takings clause indicated that only physical invasions
could amount to a taking. Michelman, supra note 52, at 1184. The Pennsylvania Coal decision
changed this established rule. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414-15.
135. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412-13.
136. Id. at 394-95.
137. Id. at 414.
138. Comment, supra note 14, at 458-59.
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mary focus is on the degree of interference with the property.'3 9 This interfer-
ence is typically measured by the property's diminution in value.'40
Since the Pennsylvania Coal decision, however, courts have been reluctant
to find a regulatory taking absent a highly intrusive regulation. Further, the
Supreme Court has shown a continuing trend of upholding land use regula-
tions that prohibit specific uses of land if they promote the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. 4 In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.," 2 the Court
upheld a zoning scheme which prohibited individuals from putting their
properties to industrial uses.'" This decision is significant because it illustrates
that a landowner is not always entitled to the highest and best use of his prop-
erty. 44 Consistent with this proposition, courts have upheld a number of wide-
ranging governmental actions, even though they may have prohibited normal
and beneficial uses of property." 5
The Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of Pennsylvania Coal is
found in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York.'" In Penn Central,
the Supreme Court ruled that the City of New York may place restrictions on
the development of individual historic landmarks without creating a taking." 7
The New York City law imposed a duty on the landowner to keep the
landmark "in good repair.""" Further, any exterior alterations or improve-
ments required approval from the Landmarks Preservation Commission.""
The Penn Central Corporation, owner of the Grand Central Train Terminal,
applied for, but was denied, permission to construct an office building atop the
landmark terminal. 50
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, began by asserting "that
the 'Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... (is) designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
139. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922).
140. Id.
141. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396-97 (1926) (upholding a prohibition on
industrial uses); see also Agins v. Tiburon; 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980) (upholding open space
zoning regulation that limited development to one single family residence per acre); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) (upholding New York Landmark Com-
mission's limitation on building rights of certain designated landmarks).
142. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
143. Id. at 396-97.
144. See id. at 389 (highest and best use does not focus on the property's present worth, but on
its potential worth).
145. See cases cited supra note 141.
146. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
147. Id. at 128-35.
148. Id. at I11-12 (finding that the "good repair" requirement was designed to assure that the
Landmark Law's objectives were not "defeated by the landmark's falling into a state of irremedia-
ble disrepair").
149. Id. at 112.
150. Id. at 116-17. The Commission's reasons for denying permission were summarized as fol-
lows: "To protect a landmark, one does not tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural features,
one does not strip them off." Id.
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justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' "151 Justice Brennan then
went on to outline the factors courts should consider when balancing the pub-
lic's interest against the landowner's rights when analyzing a nonphysical gov-
ernmental regulation.' 52 The following factors were deemed relevant for pur-
poses of balancing: 1) the regulation's economic impact on the landowner; 2)
the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed expecta-
tions; and 3) the character of governmental regulation.' 53 The majority made
it clear that all these factors were important in deciding whether a regulatory
taking existed." However, the Court did not give any explicit weight to the
various factors. Instead, the Court suggested that these various factors should
be weighted on a case-by-case basis.' 5
With respect to the first factor, the regulation's economic impact on the
landowner, the owner must show that the regulation makes the property virtu-
ally worthless.' 58 If the landowner can still earn any type of reasonable return
on his property, then the fact that he could earn substantially more money is
irrelevant.'57 Although the Penn Central Company attempted to show that the
regulation resulted in a substantial diminution of millions of dollars in the
value of the property, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, citing the
Court's previous decisions that upheld regulations which resulted in diminu-
tions of seventy-five percent and higher. 158
Furthermore, when determining the property's value, the property owner
may not subdivide his property into "discrete segments" where rights may
have been "entirely abrogated."' 5 9 Instead, courts have opted to look at inter-
151. Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). The Armstrong
Court held that petitioners had a compensable property interest, within the meaning of the fifth
amendment, in their liens on boats prior to another's transfer of title to the government. Arm-
strong, 364 U.S. at 46-49. Governmental action, which made it impossible for petitioners to en-
force their liens, effectively destroyed the value of liens, and therefore, was a compensable taking.
Id.
152. Prior to this articulation, much confusion and uncertainty existed as to what the relevant
factors in the balancing test used for a regulatory taking were.
153. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. In Penn Central, the owner was still able to obtain a reasonable rate of return on his
investment, and therefore, the Court held that no taking arose. Id. at 136. The Court's final foot-
note, however, suggests that the property must cease to be "economically viable" before the regu-
lation reaches the level of a taking. Id. at 138 n.36. The clear implication is that the property
owner must show a total loss of economic value to establish a taking. See also Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (if height restriction makes property "wholly
useless, the rights of property ... prevail over the public interest" and compensation is required)
(emphasis added).
157. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
158. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (sustaining zoning law that caused
75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (sustaining regulation
that caused an 871/2% diminution in value).
159. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). This subdivision of prop-
erty into segments has been referred to as "conceptual severance." See Radin, supra note 2, at
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ference with "rights of the parcel as a whole."' 60 In Penn Central, the major-
ity expressly rejected Penn Central's argument that the restrictions on their
air rights made those rights worthless, and therefore, the regulation was com-
pensable. 68 Because the Penn Central property, as a whole, could still earn a
reasonable return, it was irrelevant that the air rights became virtually
worthless. 16 2
The Penn Central Court also disputed the landmark owner's contention that
a unique burden on a particular landowner was enough to constitute a taking.
According to the majority, "[L]egislation designed to promote the general wel-
fare commonly burdens some more than others."' 63 This "unique burden" test
is only one aspect in the Court's balancing approach and a seemingly minor
one at that. 6" Nevertheless, the law's impact on Penn Central's property was
closely analyzed. The majority noted that the New York City law did not
interfere with the present use and "primary expectation concerning the use of
the parcel," which was its continued use as a railroad terminal containing of-
fice space and concessions.6
The dissent, written by Justice Rehnquist, disputed the majority's character-
izations. According to the dissent, the regulation placed a unique burden on a
small number of buildings that had the unfortunate luck of being considered
landmarks. 6' This landmark designation resulted in a loss of millions of dol-
lars to Penn Central, with no corresponding benefits. 67
Justice Rehnquist also suggested that there is a significant constitutional
distinction between regulations that prohibit harms and regulations that force
a landowner to confer a benefit on society. 6 "Harm prevention" is the term
1676 (stating that conceptual severance consists of "delineating a property interest consisting of
just what the government action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that partic-
ular whole thing has been permanently taken").
160. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. in Penn Central, the Court stated:
Taking jurisprudence does not 'divide a single parcel into discrete segments and at-
tempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abro-
gated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking,
this court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ....
Id.
161. Id. at 136-37.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 133.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 136.
166. Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that the owner of a landmark discovers
that a "landmark designation imposes upon him a substantial cost, with little or no offsetting
benefit except for the honor of the designation").
167. Id. at 142-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Radin, supra note 2, at 1676 (noting
that Justice Rehnquist forcefully argued for conceptual severance in Penn Central when he argued
that the Landmark Law's resulting deprivation of Penn Central's right to develop an office build-
ing over the Grand Central Terminal was a complete taking of Penn Central's air rights in the
property).
168. Penn Cent. Transp. Corp. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 146 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
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often given to the government's undisputed ability to prevent a property owner
from using his property to injure others without having to compensate the
owner for the value of his forbidden use. 69 This "harm prevention" rationale
has traditionally been a major justification for upholding governmental regula-
tions.170 Rehnquist distinguished these traditional harm prevention cases from
Penn Central because the regulation in Penn Central did not prevent a nui-
sance. Instead, it forced the landowner to provide a benefit to the public,
namely, that of maintaining a landmark.17' Rehnquist perceived the plaintiff
corporation as being "prevented from further developing its property because
it did too good a job in designing and building it.' 72 According to Rehnquist,
this affirmative duty on Penn Central to keep the landmark in "good repair"
was the exact type of cost that Armstrong v. United States declared should be
borne by the public as a whole "in all fairness and justice.' 73
II. THE SEAWALL CASE
Seawall Associates v. City of New York' 7 4 presented one of the first oppor-
tunities for a court to apply the Supreme Court's recently adopted takings
framework, as expressed in Loretto,' Nollan,7 6 and Penn Central.77 In Sea-
wall, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a state land use
regulation constituted a permanent physical occupation or a regulatory intru-
sion. 17 If the New. York court determined the law to be a permanent physical
occupation, Loretto would control and thus would compel the City of New
ing) (objecting to the Commission's ability, through the Landmark Law, to exercise complete
dominion over the landmark owner's property).
169. See Finnell, Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theories and the Taking
Issue, 67 N.C.L. REV. 627, 678-79 (1989) (Public nuisance law prohibits certain harms to public
interests, and "regulations that prevent harm that would otherwise constitute public nuisances...
should not constitute takings because of the importance of the harm prevention in takings
jurisprudence.").
170. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding zoning ordinance
where regulating body could identify a "harmful" use of land as being the object of the regulation
and ordinance was neither unreasonable, excessive, nor unduly burdensome); Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding zoning ordinance which put petitioner's brickyard out of
business, because the brickyard, although not a nuisance per se, was still found to be harmful to
the public health); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (holding that the regulation
was justified by public purpose, such that no degree of interference with the land would create a
taking).
171. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 146-48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960)).
174. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, (en banc), cert, denied, I10 S. Ct.
500 (1989).
175. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
176. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
177. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
178. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 99-102, 542 N.E.2d at 1061-62, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45.
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York to compensate landowners." 9 On the other hand, if the court found the
law to be a regulatory intrusion, Nollan and Penn Central would control. Con-
sequently, the city would be only potentially liable to compensate the landown-
ers.180 The Seawall court, unfortunately, found it difficult to apply Supreme
Court precedent on takings. The court first held that the New York land use
regulation constituted a permanent physical occupation. Then the court pro-
ceeded to hold that, even if the regulation did not constitute a permanent
physical occupation, the regulation nevertheless created an impermissible reg-
ulatory taking. 81
A. Facts and Procedure
After years of encouraging the demolition of single room occupancy proper-
ties ("SRO"), the City of New York abandoned this strategy and decided to
protect SRO properties. 82 This protection began when the City of New York
discovered that the quantity of low-cost housing was shrinking dramatically.' 83
In an attempt to protect the poor and limit the number of homeless, the city
enacted Local Law No. 9, which placed a five year moratorium on the conver-
sion, alteration, and demolition of SRO multiple dwellings.' 8 Local Law No.
9 further required SRO property owners to rehabilitate and make habitable
every SRO unit in their buildings and to lease out all units to "bona fide"
tenants.18 5
Local Law No. 9 included substantial penalties for noncompliance and al-
lowed for the owner to purchase a "buy-out" exemption from the moratorium
by payment of $45,000 per unit.' There was also a hardship exemption for
owners able to show that "there [was] no reasonable possibility that such
owner [could] make a reasonable rate of return," defined for statutory pur-
poses as a net annual rate of eight and one-half percent of the property's as-
sessed value as an SRO multiple dwelling. 7
The plaintiffs in Seawall were owners of SRO housing. These owners chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Local Law No. 9, claiming that it constituted a
compensable taking under the fifth amendment. 8 The Supreme Court of
New York, which is the state's intermediate appellate court, held that the so-
179. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text (discussing Loretto).
180. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (discussing Nollan); supra notes 146-65
and accompanying text (discussing Penn Central).
181. Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 99, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1061, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989); see infra notes 191-209 and
accompanying text.
182. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 100-01, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45.
183. Id.
184. Id. The moratorium was renewable for additional five-year periods as the city council
deemed necessary. Id.
185. Id. at 100, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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called "buy-out," "replacement," and "hardship" exemptions failed to save
Local Law No. 9, and that the law constituted a taking of property.'89 The
Appellate Division of New York reversed the Supreme Court of New York,
and declared the law constitutional as a valid exercise of the state's police
power.' 90
B. The Majority Opinion (Court of Appeals)
The highest court of New York, the Court of Appeals, reversed the Appel-
late Division and found Local Law No. 9 infirm under both the federal and
state Constitutions. According to the court, the law constituted a compensable
taking.' The majority declared the city's law unconstitutional "on its face,
finding it so repulsive to constitutional principles that it was unnecessary for
the Court to use an 'as applied' test, the almost universally preferred context
within which a statute's constitutionality is adjudicated."' 92 Seemingly unsure
of whether the law was physical or regulatory in nature, the court declared
that Local Law No. 9 could not pass muster under either standard.
Justice Hancock's majority opinion distinguished the law in question from
the more common rent control statutes.' 3 The court differentiated Local Law
No. 9 from rent control statutes because the law in question imposed an af-
firmative duty on landowners to refurbish the structures and keep them fully
rented.9 The court accepted plaintiff's argument that the regulation resulted
in a physical occupation of their property, and therefore, was a per se compen-
sable taking under Loretto.99 The court reasoned that the nature and extent
of the interference determined whether a physical taking arose. 9 In this in-
stance, Local Law No. 9 constituted a serious infringement on the plaintiff's
right to exclude others, one of the most important strands in the landowner's
bundle of rights. 97 Therefore, a physical taking arose. By accepting that Local
Law No. 9 created a physical taking, the Seawall court necessarily rejected
189. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 138 Misc. 2d 96, 523 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1987), afid in
part and rev'd in part, 142 A.D.2d 72, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1988), rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542
N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
190. Seawall Assocs. v, City of New York, 142 A.D.2d 72, 87, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958, 968 (1988),
rev'd, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 500 (1989).
191. Id.
192. Sweeney, Seawall Decision: An Important Essay on Land Use and Fundamental Fairness,
N.Y.L.J, Sept. 6, 1989, at 1, col. I (emphasis in original).
193. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 99, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1061, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
194. Id; see also Sweeney, supra note 192, at 2, col. 3. (stating that the court distinguished
Local Law No. 9 from legitimate rent control regulations by finding that rent control statutes
were mere "adjustments" to the landlord-tenant relationship, unlike the New York Law, which
deprived landowners of their primary rights of possession, and their corresponding rights to ex-
clude others).
195. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 102-04, 542 N.E.2d at 1063-64, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546-47.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 106, 542 N.E.2d at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
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the City of New York's call for a narrower definition of a physical taking.
This narrower definition would have required a fixed encroachment or an ac-
tual invasion of property, similar to that of the flooding created in
Pumpelly.t" Although the Supreme Court has not, as of yet, ruled on whether
the loss of possessory interests, including the right to exclude, would constitute
a per se physical taking, the majority held that it believed the Supreme Court
would so hold.1 99
Moreover, the Seawall court declared that even if a physical taking had not
occurred, Local Law No. 9 still constituted a regulatory taking.200 Using the
standard balancing test traditionally applied to regulatory takings, the court
declared that the regulation both: 1) denied the landowner an economically
viable use of his property, and 2) did not substantially advance any legitimate
state interests. 01 The court declared that such a serious intrusion on the right
to possess and use property inevitably impaired the ability of the property
owner to sell the property at any sum approaching his investment. 0 2 There-
fore, by prohibiting commercial development, Local Law No. 9 seriously dam-
aged the economic viability of the property.2 °0
The law in question also did not pass muster under the "rational nexus" test
as set forth in Nollan. The goal of Local Law No. 9 was to alleviate the grow-
ing homeless problem. Although this goal was undeniably a permissible gov-
ernment end, the state failed to show that the law substantially advanced that
end.204 Using heightened scrutiny, the Seawall court looked at empirical evi-
dence disputing the conclusion that more low-cost housing would substantially
198. Id. at 103-07, 542 N.E.2d at 1063-64, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546-48. See Sweeney, supra note
192, at 2, col. 3 (The majority rejected the city's argument that the SRO owner still retained the
right to accept or reject individual tenants and to set rental terms other than the amount of
controlled rents. The majority "brushed this aside saying that it is the 'forced occupation' by
strangers under the rent up provisions, not the identity of the new tenants or the terms of the lease
which deprives the SRO owners of their possessory interest and results in the physical taking.").
199. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 99, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1061, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989); see also Hall v. Santa Barbara,
833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that an ordinance imposing mandatory rental obligations
on mobile home operators could constitute a per se physical taking under Loretto), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 940 (1988).
200. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 106-08, 542 N.E.2d at 1065-67, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548-49.
201. Id. at 107, 542 N.E.2d at 1065-66, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
202. Id. at 108, 542 N.E.2d at 1066, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
203. Id. at 108-10, 542 N.E.2d at 1066-67, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549-50. The majority explicitly
rejected the city's contention that the owners' very real ability to earn some type of profit on the
land should work heavily against the landowner's challenge. Id. Although there is little doubt that
under Local Law No. 9, landowners retained numerous property rights and could make a profit,
the Seawall court rejected the contention that Local Law No. 9 was constitutional merely because
the landowners retained many preexisting rights. Id. According to Justice Hancock, "the perma-
nent abrogation of one of those rights, without regard to its comparative value in relation to the
whole, may well be sufficient to constitute a taking." Id. at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 550.
204. Id. at 111-13, 542 N.E.2d at 1068-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
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alleviate the homeless problem." 5 The court described the nexus between the
ends and means as "indirect at best and conjectural."" 6 The majority rejected
the contention that the exemptions mitigated the invidious effects of Local
Law No. 9, ruling that they were as much "out-and-out ... extortion" as the
situation in Nollan.20 7 Finally, the majority reasserted Justice Rehnquist's
view that there is a constitutional difference between regulations that prevent
harms and regulations that force a private landowner to confer a benefit on
society.2"8 The majority described Local Law No. 9 as imposing an affirmative
requirement on landowners to dedicate their properties to a public purpose.
Thus, Seawall was distinguishable from other Supreme Court cases that up-
held laws under a harm prevention rationale.20 9
C. The Dissent
The dissent in Seawall, which was written by Justice Bellacosa and joined
by Chief Justice Wachtler, accused the majority of engaging in substantive
due process, or "Lochnerizing," because it exalted property rights over the
legislature's attempt to implement social policy.210 Justice Bellacosa then at-
tacked the majority's heightened scrutiny standard, 21' preferring a more defer-
ential standard and a presumptive threshold of constitutionality that often at-
taches to legislative acts.2"2 The dissent was particularly critical of the
majority's decision to accept a "facial" challenge to the law in question: that
is, that the law in question was a taking in all of its applications, and a taking
as to all properties.2"' According to the dissent, such a facial challenge was
seen as a disproportionate remedy and over-inclusive.214 Accepting such a fa-
205. Id. at I11, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (stating that "[t]he City's own
Blackburn study .. .acknowledge[d] that a ban on converting, destroying, and warehousing SRO
units would do little to resolve the homeless crisis").
206. Id. at 112, 542 N.E.2d at 1069, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
207. Id. at 114, 542 N.E.2d at 1070, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 553 (quoting J.E.D Assocs., Inc. v.
Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
208. ld..
209. Id.
210. Id. at 118, 542 N.E.2d at 1072, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (stating
that judges should show deference to the government's decision to protect SRO's, which are an
important shelter for potentially 52,000 displaced homeless). In Lochner v. New York, the Su-
preme Court declared that a New York state law which attempted to limit the working hours of
bakers was unconstitutional. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). This infamous decision has been criticized as
being an unwarranted example of judicial overactivism and for creating "substantive due process"
by exalting rights over the legislature's attempt to implement social policy. Id. at 74 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Contract rights were at issue in Lochner. Arguably, the Seawall court similarly ex-
alted property rights to usurp the New York legislature's attempt to implement social policy.
211. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 117-18, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1072-73,
544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 555-56 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989) (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 121, 542 N.E.2d at 1075, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 558 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
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cial challenge effectively "demolishe[d] a legislative structure designed to pro-
tect those in dire need." ' This demolition of the legislative structure had the
effect of "authoriz[ing] the expulsion of fifty-two thousand people." '16
Additionally, Justice Bellacosa believed that Local Law No. 9 was sustaina-
ble under existing precedent. According to the dissent, cases such as Penn
Central "approved significant encroachments on the libertarian ideal of prop-
erty rights against the 'takings' claims,"2"' and Local Law No. 9 was merely
another example of the principle that a landowner is not entitled to the highest
and best use of her property.21 8
Justice Bellacosa further reasoned that a per se physical taking approach
was inapplicable because Local Law No. 9 involved a temporary five-year in-
trusion.2 9 This temporary intrusion, therefore, did not constitute a permanent
physical occupation, which was the required standard. 2 0 The dissent also dis-
puted that the law constituted a regulatory taking. Instead, the dissent de-
scribed the law as a "tourniquet" to stop the loss of low-cost housing. 221
While the majority seemed to emphasize the regulation's intrusive nature on
the landowner, the dissent preferred to focus on the substantial government
interest in protecting the homeless.222 The dissent had no difficulty finding that
the law substantially advanced a legitimate governmental interest of the
"greatest societal purpose."'2 3 The dissent also was unwilling to allow for a
broad definition of "economically viable use" of the property. Justice Bellacosa
cited case law that required "the economic value, or all but a bare residue of
the economic value," be destroyed before a law would constitute a regulatory
taking.22'
III. ANALYSIS
Although the Seawall holding can be applauded for its end result, which
protects substantive property rights from an extremely intrusive regulation, the
majority opinion can, nevertheless, be criticized for being somewhat confused
215. Id. at 122, 542 N.E.2d at 1075, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 558 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 126, 542 N.E.2d at 1078, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 119, 542 N.E.2d at 1073, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
218. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); see also de St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68
N.Y.2d 66, 77, 496 N.E.2d 879, 885, 505 N.Y.S.2d 859, 865 (1986) (requiring the property
owner to prove "by 'dollars and cents' evidence that under no use permitted by the regulation
under attack would the properties be capable of producing a reasonable return; the economic
value, or all but a bare residue of the economic value, of the parcels must have been destroyed").
219. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 123, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1076, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 558-59 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 125, 542 N.E.2d at 1077, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (believing
Local Law No. 9 to substantially advance the city counsel's interest in preserving SROs and
preventing the increasing flow of homeless into the streets of New York).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 126, 542 N.E.2d at 1077, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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and indecisive. The majority's holding, seemingly unsure of whether Local
Law No. 9 was physical or regulatory in nature, struck down the law as a
taking under both approaches. 2 5 This sweeping style of judicial analysis en-
sures protection for property rights but is likely to create confusion for land-
owners, judges, and the legal community in general. These individuals are still
left in the dark as to when a regulation should be characterized as physical,
and therefore, compensable per se under Loretto.
A. Why all the Confusion?
In defense of the New York Court of Appeals, the justices deciding Seawall
were saddled with a confusing background of case law. The primary confusion
that resulted in Seawall is directly attributable to an artificial and unnecessary
distinction in the treatment between physical and regulatory takings created in
Loretto.22 As commentators such as Michelman have indicated, a system
based on distinctions between physical and regulatory invasions is inherently
unworkable.22 Not only is it difficult to know where to draw the line between
laws that are physical and laws that are regulatory in nature,228 but it is also
clear that laws deemed regulatory can be just as intrusive, and often more
intrusive, than regulations that are deemed "physical occupations. '229 Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court has, in effect, held exactly the opposite. Through
its explicit per se rule toward physical takings, the Supreme Court has held
that all physical occupations, even seemingly minor intrusions, are more wor-
thy of compensation than occupations deemed regulatory.2"'
The Supreme Court's takings structure falters because it ignores the fact
that governmental regulations typically affect different property interests. Also
ignored is the fact that regulations seem to vary widely in terms of how intru-
225. Id. at 106, 542 N.E.2d at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
226. 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (distinguishing regulations which cause permanent physical oc-
cupations and those which do not rise to the level of a permanent physical occupation).
227. Michelman, supra note 52, at 1227-28 (stating that a justification for a physical invasion
test is extremely weak, and the test's inability to distinguish between significant and insignificant
intrusions is the fatal flaw of the test).
228. Although takings that are "physical" may seem to be easily distinguishable from takings
that are "regulatory," in actuality, the wide spectrum of governmental regulations makes categori-
zation quite difficult. See Michelman, supra note 52, at 1188 (stating that there are some kinds of
governmental restrictions which are hard to analyze as acquisitions of conventionally recognized
property interests). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court and lower courts have glossed over this
problem, which may be one reason why the Seawall majority was so uncertain about the best way
to declare Local Law No. 9 unconstitutional.
229. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1609 n.46 (stating that by any common-sense appraisal, "the
easement conditionally imposed on the Nollans by the Commission was, in content if not in form,
more invasive and offensive than the easement imposed on Loretto by New York").
230. The result in Loretto probably arose from the concept behind a physical occupation, which
seems to connote a high level of intrusiveness. See Michelman, supra note 52, at 1185 ("[W]e are
accustomed to thinking of compensation as being a requirement coupled with 'takings' of 'prop-
erty.' 'Property' suggests a thing owned, and 'taking' suggests physical appropriation.").
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sive the regulation is on property rights.23 There would seem to be a contin-
uum in terms of the intrusiveness of a regulation, rather than the dichotomy
between physical and regulatory that the Supreme Court has created. Typical
regulatory takings interfere with a landowner's economic enjoyment of the
property, or a landowner's distinct investment-backed expectations. 2 ' Al-
though infringement on such economic rights is qualitatively different from
intrusions on the right to use and possess property, such economic infringe-
ment is not necessarily less intrusive than regulations that physically intrude
on a landowner. A bright line rule, such as the Loretto holding, does not at-
tempt to measure the intrusiveness to the landowner. Instead, this type of rule
holds that any permanent physical occupation is irrebuttably too intrusive, and
therefore, compensable. In this manner, the per se rule fails to take into ac-
count the fact that laws seen as regulatory may involve a level of intrusion at
least as great as a physical invasion."'
The requirement in Loretto that a physical occupation must be "perma-
nent" to fall under the per se rule was another source of confusion for the
Seawall court.234 Although the word "permanent" may appear self-explana-
tory, the Supreme Court has failed, as of yet, to give any clear indication of
what constitutes "permanent." '2 5 Consequently, lower courts will continue to
231. Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 450 (1982) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the current state of the law which often upholds intrusive govern-
mental regulations that diminish the value of private property "far more than minor physical
touchings," while striking down de minimis physical occupations which do not significantly in-
fringe on property rights).
232. Investment-backed expectations refer not to the overall investment in the property, but to
the investment made with a currently frustrated particular purpose or expectation in mind.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 150-51, 423 N.E.2d 320, 333,
440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 856-57 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
233. See Radin, supra note 2, at 1672-73. Radin explains:
Loretto exacerbates the well-known paradox of takings jurisprudence: owners may
suffer large pecuniary losses-as in Penn Central, or for that matter the classic Eu-
clid loss-without a court's finding a taking requiring compensation, whereas if the
court decides to characterize the government action as a physical occupation, a taking
will be found even if the loss or inconvenience to the owner is minuscule.
Id.
234. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 1609 n.46 (stating that distinctions between permanent
and temporary are formalistic since "the legally determinative fact is the state of permanent ex-
posure imposed by [the] regulation") (emphasis added).
235. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982). To under-
score the importance or the "constitutional distinction between a permanent occupation and a
temporary physical invasion," the Loretto Court cited PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980). Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434. In PruneYard, the Supreme Court upheld a state
constitutional requirement that owners of public shopping centers permit individuals to exercise
free speech rights on their property. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88. The Court emphasized that the
state constitution did not prevent owners from restricting expression through reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on solicitors. Id. at 83-84. Since the invasion on shopping center
owners, therefore, was temporary and limited, the fact that solicitors did in fact physically invade
the property did not dictate a finding of a compensable taking. Id.
Even if one accepts the constitutional distinction between temporary and permanent, the Su-
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struggle, as the Seawall court did, with the issue of what constitutes a perma-
nent regulation. In cases such as Seawall, defining "permanent" becomes even
more important because the regulation in question involved a five-year morato-
rium, renewable as the City of New York saw fit.236 The regulation's duration
in Seawall was unknowable and dependent on many factors, particularly the
future plight of the poor and homeless in New York.
After Loretto, landowners will try to describe regulations imposed upon
them as physical in order to take advantage of the per se rule of physical
takings. The end result is that landowners will broadly define "permanent"
and "physical" in an attempt to encourage courts to apply Loretto's per se
rule.
B. Applying Two Bodies of Law
After spending the bulk of its opinion describing why Local Law No. 9 cre-
ated a physical taking, the Seawall court then went on to hold that the same
law also could constitute a regulatory taking. 37 This continuation was unfor-
tunate and unnecessary because it did not help explain when a regulation is
physical, as opposed to regulatory, and also did not explain how a regulation
could constitute both a physical and a regulatory taking.
Local Law No. 9 would seem to be close to the mental dividing line between
intrusions that are physical and intrusions that are regulatory in nature; conse-
quently, Local Law No. 9 was an excellent example of how difficult it can be
to label or characterize a regulation. Although the regulation clearly infringed
on a landowner's right to exclude others by limiting the use of her property to
single room occupancy housing, it seems different from the historical context
in which the concept of physical takings arose.2 38 Here, the infringement was
more subtle; the government took the property for a public use but not
through any type of direct invasion. The government neither palpably invaded
the property nor attempted to take the property's title. With such a subtle
regulation, it is apparent that Local Law No. 9 did not clearly fit into either a
physical or regulatory framework. The Seawall court may have recognized
this problem. Nevertheless, the court tried to analyze the regulation as both a
physical and a regulatory taking.
Local Law No. 9, in effect, forced landowners to be landlords; the law in
question drove the landowner off his own property by forcing him to rent his
preme Court has avoided, or assumed as self-evident, the different question of how long an in-
fringement must last to constitute a permanent occupation. As Seawall demonstrates, the distinc-
tion between permanent and temporary may not be as clear as the Supreme Court would like the
legal community to believe.
236. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 100-01, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1061, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 544-45 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
237. Id. at 106, 542 N.E.2d at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
238. Traditional takings law was that "in the absence of explicit expropriation, a compensable
taking could occur only through physical encroachment and occupation." Michelman, supra note
52, at 1184 (emphasis in original).
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property to others. The Seawall court recognized that the resulting forced ten-
ancy denied the owner his right of possession to the property along with the
corresponding right to exclude others.? 9 Further, the Seawall court recog-
nized that these rights were viewed as basic strands in the bundle of rights
known as property.""0 Unfortunately, the Seawall court's ability to correctly
identify the rights that were being infringed did not help the court answer the
far different question of whether such an infringement was physical or regula-
tory in nature.2" 1
The Seawall majority appeared to be operating under one of two assump-
tions: either 1) the court believed that characterizing the regulation was irrele-
vant because Local Law No. 9 failed under both a physical and regulatory
analysis; or 2) the court believed that there were certain regulations, such as
Local Law No. 9, that were impossible to categorize, and therefore, could be
analyzed under either a physical or regulatory approach. The result of these
assumptions is an overly broad opinion and continuing confusion as to where
the line is between physical and regulatory takings.
C. Intrusiveness and Social Policy
In determining the correct approach to the takings clause, two questions
should always be asked: first, how intrusive is the regulation in question; and
second, to what degree should the government be allowed to intrude on prop-
erty rights to further a substantial government interest.2 ' The first question
requires a factual determination as to how the regulation is actually affecting
the landowner, 4" while the second question is a policy-oriented inquiry that
239. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 102-05, 542 N.E.2d at 1062-64, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 546-47.
240. Id. at 109, 542 N.E.2d at 1067, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
241. The Seawall majority held that Local Law No. 9's infringement on the intangible right to
exclude would be sufficient to constitute a physical taking, while the dissent countered that the
physical invasions declared compensable in previous cases, like Loretto. were palpable tangible
invasions. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text. The dissent argued for a narrower
definition of physical taking that would require "some actual displacement of the owner's posses-
sion through a fixed encroachment like the TV equipment in Loretto or an invasion of property
like the flooding in Pumpelly." Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 104, 542
N.E.2d 1059, 1063, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546-47 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
242. See Radin, supra note 2, at 1680-81. Professor Radin believes that two dominant schools
of thought exist in terms of deciding how to analyze government regulations: the pragmatists and
the conceptualists. Id. Pragmatists believe in looking at the particular instances of the cases and
the context of the situation. Id. The result is often an "all-things-considered intuitive weighing."
Id. Because conceptualists advocate set rules to avoid potential arbitrary rulings, they are opposed
to pragmatists' ad hoc analysis. Id. Loretto and Penn Central represent this ongoing conflict be-
tween the pragmatists and balancing, on the one hand, and the conceptualists and the per se rules,
on the other. Id.
243. Placing the primary emphasis on how intrusive the regulation is to the landowner, as op-
posed to looking at how valid the government purpose is, gives less deference to government ac-
tions. Under this author's analysis, Penn Central was incorrectly decided because the regulation
took a minority of landowners and placed an affirmative duty on these individuals to maintain
their property as landmarks. Although the government seems to have a valid interest in maintain-
ing landmarks as such, it is not clear why the government can avoid paying for this privilege.
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focuses on how far the government should be allowed to go in terms of imple-
menting public policy.
With respect to the intrusiveness of the regulation, it is erroneous to make a
constitutional distinction between intrusions that are permanent and intrusions
that can be described as temporary. " To begin with, the Supreme Court has
failed to adequately define "temporary" or "permanent." 2" -Further, creating
a dichotomy between temporary and permanent focuses the analysis on the
type of the intrusion, rather than on the extent of the intrusion. For instance,
depending on the particular regulation, a temporary invasion can be highly
intrusive on property rights, whereas a permanent intrusion may be relatively
tolerable to the landowner.2" 6 In Loretto, for example, the "permanent" intru-
sion was the wiring of cable lines along a roof, an intrusion that many individ-
uals would find relatively innocuous.
With respect to the amount government should be allowed to intrude on
property rights to further a substantial government interest, courts should em-
ploy the traditional distinction between regulations that prohibit harms and
regulations that force the landowner to confer benefits on society."' Although
it is undisputed that the state has the right to prohibit the landowner from
injuring others,24 the government should not be able to impose affirmative
duties on landowners. Although implementing such a suggestion would materi-
ally limit government's ability to enact certain zoning and land use ordinances,
substantial regulations would still be allowed whenever the landowner's use of
the property infringes or harms others. In effect, this proposal merely breathes
life into the Supreme Court's declaration that the fifth amendment's purpose
is to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which
should be borne by the public as a whole.249 Although it is often difficult to
draw a line between "preventing harms" and forcing the landowner to provide
a benefit,26 it is this inquiry with which future courts should be concerned,
244. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (commentary criticizing the current test
which makes a distinction between permanent and temporary takings).
245. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (Justice Blackmun's comments regarding this
subject). Although distinctions between temporary and permanent do not provide a suitable
framework for determining whether a taking has actually occurred, such a distinction would seem
to become highly relevant in determining the amount of just compensation. A permanent taking
should trigger considerably more compensation than a temporary taking because the permanent
intrusion necessarily occurs over a longer period of time.
247. See Kmiec, supra note 2, at 1635.
248. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-90 (1987) (reaffirm-
ing the nuisance exception to the compensation requirement).
249. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
250. One example of the difficulty in drawing such distinctions is where a company wants to
place a billboard along a highway. See D. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAw 418-19 (1988) (discuss-
ing how courts have inconsistently applied the takings clause with respect to billboard regula-
tions). If the state tried to prevent the company from placing the billboard along the road, by
citing aesthetic concerns, it would be an open question if such a regulation would be allowed
under the classic harms/benefits dichotomy. Is this billboard regulation merely prohibiting a nui-
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while hopefully, disregarding the artificial distinctions created in Loretto.
D. Protecting Property Rights
Despite difficulties in clearly articulating a takings standard, the Seawall
opinion can be applauded for protecting property rights from a highly intru-
sive regulation that forced landowners to solve issues which should be thought
of as societal problems. By forcing owners of single room occupancy housing to
remain as such, Local Law No. 9 took a discrete minority of landowners and
forced them, alone, to help the homeless. In that regard, Local Law No. 9 is
analogous to a regulation that would require fast food outlets to remain res-
taurants, if it could be shown that such outlets were an inexpensive source of
nutrition for poor and indigent people. Although such an effort to help the
poor would be applauded by some, Seawall stands for the proposition that
such affirmative obligations are overly intrusive on property rights and deserve
just compensation."'
By noting the duties that the ordinance placed on landlords, the Seawall
court recognized the constitutional difference between regulations that prevent
landowners from harming others and regulations that require landowners to
confer a benefit on others. 52 The majority correctly noted that it is the nature
of the intrusion, rather- than the regulation's purpose, that is determinative.25
Further, the majority recognized that if a regulation requires a landowner to
provide a service to the public at large, the regulation is more in the nature of
a taking.254 If it merely prohibits the landowner from creating a nuisance, it is
less of a government invasion. The dichotomy between regulations that prevent
harms and regulations that force a landowner to confer benefits is often pre-
sent in landlord-tenant laws, which typically only regulate the manner in
sance, or does it force the company to confer a benefit on society, by giving the public aestheti-
cally pleasing views along the highway? Another way of stating the question is to ask whether the
public should be entitled to aesthetically pleasing views along the highways, or should society have
to pay corporations for imposing such restraints?
251. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 117, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1071, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 555 (en banc) (finding that the city of New York, "by affirmatively requiring the
owners to put their properties to a public use '[was] acting in its enterprise capacity, where it
[took] unto itself private resources in use for the common good' ") (quoting Lutheran Church v.
City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 128-29 (1974)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989); see also
Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-63 (1964) (distinguishing between the
government's above-mentioned enterprise capacity, and the government's arbitral capacity, which
is used when the government intervenes "to straighten out situations in which the citizenry is in
conflict over land use or where one person's use of his land is injurious to others..." and conclud-
ing that the dividing line for takings should be the distinction between the government's enterprise
capacity, or compensable taking, and arbitral capacity, or noncompensable regulations).
252. See Kmiec, supra note 2, at 1651 (recognizing a clear need to "draw a distinction between
the use of the police power to prevent harms as opposed to its use to extract benefits, a distinction
central to the nuisance exception to the just compensation requirement acknowledged by all mem-
bers of the Court").
253. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 105, 542 N.E.2d at 1064, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
254. Id. at 105-06, 542 N.E.2d at 1064-65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 547-48.
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which an owner oversees his property. 55 Unlike other landlord-tenant laws,
however, Local Law No. 9 compelled landowners to be residential landlords by
"placing petitioners in a business, forcing them to remain in the business and
refusing to allow them to ever cease doing that business."2" By striking down
Local Law No. 9, the majority recognized that such an affirmative duty of
dedicating the property to a public purpose is offensive to the fifth amendment.
The majority opinion also wisely avoided creating a constitutional distinc-
tion between permanent and temporary occupations. The majority ignored the
fact that the law was not permanent, but instead, was a five-year renewable
moratorium.157 This was appropriate because there is no sound rationale for
making a distinction between temporary and permanent occupations for pur-
poses of determining whether a taking has occurred. The Seawall court seem-
ingly recognized that drawing a distinction between temporary and permanent
occupations is not only difficult, but nonsensical; a renewable five-year morato-
rium may very well last for the effective life of the property since it can be
renewed indefinitely. On the other hand, New York may choose to forsake
renewal of the moratorium after five years, thus leaving only a temporary in-
trusion. Therefore, it was impossible to determine whether the law was a tak-
ing by looking at the regulation's duration.
Finally, the Seawall court seemed to implicitly adopt the notion of "concep-
tual severance." A conceptual severance occurs when a property owner men-
tally divides a single property into discrete segments of property, and then
asserts that a particular segment or interest in the property has been com-
pletely taken away.2"8 The Seawall majority arguably accepted such an argu-
ment when it held that to permit abrogation of a particular property right,
here, the right to exclude, "without regard to its comparative value in relation
to the whole, may well be sufficient to constitute a taking."" 9 According to the
majority,
if the theory of "conceptual severance" were applied to the effect of Local
Law No. 9 on the rights of SRO property owners, a taking would necessa-
rily be found. The rights to use and to possess have been abolished and,
without regard to the value of the owners' remaining interests in their build-
ings, that would be sufficient.26 0
255. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (federal rent control statute which
did not require any owner to offer any accommodations for rent); Loab Estates, Inc. v. Druhe, 300
N.Y. 176, 90 N.E.2d 25 (1949) (landlord-tenant regulation, which applied only to existing tenan-
cies, barred the eviction of residential tenants unless provisions existed for relocation).
256. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 110, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 551 (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
257. The fact that the city council could renew the moratorium whenever it deemed necessary,
however, seems to undermine the temporary nature of Local Law No. 9. Id. at 100-01, 542
N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45.
258. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing conceptual severance).
259. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1062, 544 N.Y.S.2d. at 542.
260. Id. at 110, 542 N.E.2d at 1067-68, 544 N.Y.S.2d. at 550.
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This apparent embracing of conceptual severance is significant, as it may
prove hard to reconcile with the Penn Central Court's holding that taking ju-
risprudence "does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt
to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated." '2 61
IV. IMPACT
The Seawall holding262 has important ramifications as both a physical and a
regulatory takings precedent. By disregarding the requirement in Loretto that
the law be a "permanent" occupation, 263 Seawall may have expanded the
number of regulations that are subject to Loretto's per se rule that all physical
occupations are compensable. 264 As a regulatory takings precedent, Seawall
may confirm the suspicions of some that Nollan265 can be utilized in the future
as a powerful tool by courts seeking to apply more stringent scrutiny on regu-
latory takings.
A. Expanding Loretto
By disregarding the requirement that a physical occupation must also be
permanent to be per se compensable, Seawall seems to both modify and also
expand Loretto's scope and potential applicability. Previously, the Supreme
Court specified that a permanent physical occupation was required to trigger
the per se rule elaborated in Loretto.216 Seawall, however, involved a limited
five-year moratorium, which presumably would make the intrusion temporary
and take Local Law No. 9 out of Loretto's scope.267 However, the Seawall
court disregarded the temporary nature of Local Law No. 9 and found the
regulation to be a per se taking under Loretto.26 By sidestepping the "perma-
nent" requirement in Loretto, Seawall may make it easier for landowners to
prove a taking; arguably, even temporary physical occupations are now per se
compensable.
261. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). See supra note 160
and accompanying text (discussing the Penn Central Court's rejection of conceptual severance).
262. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1989) (en banc) (holding New York Local Law No. 9 be both a physical and regulatory taking),
cert. denied, I10 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
263. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (requiring "a
permanent, physical occupation" for a taking to arise).
264. See Sweeney, supra note 192, at 2, col. 5 (suggesting that "the majority in [Seawall] may
be forging a new and more stringent regulatory taking jurisprudence for municipalities and giving
greater latitude to the development community to challenge local land use enactments as regula-
tory takings").
265. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (198.7).
266. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
267. But see supra note 257 (acknowledging the fact that the five-year moratorium was poten-
tially indefinitely renewable at the legislature's discretion).
268. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 106 n.5, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 n.5,
544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 548 n.5 (en banc), cert. denied, I10 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
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B. Applying Nollan
Seawall is also important as one of the first cases to apply Nollan.26 ' As
mentioned earlier, Nollan held that a governmental regulation which infringes
on a property owner's rights must "substantially advance" a legitimate govern-
ment interest.2 70 Nollan's substantial nexus test, which requires a close rela-
tionship between the regulation's means and the end result to be served, seems
to necessitate heightened scrutiny.271 Such intermediate scrutiny is important
because it may require an actual statistical relationship between means and
ends, not just a logical or plausible relationship.272
There has, however, been much dispute recently among commentators over
how expansively Nollan would be applied.2 73 Nollan could be applied to exac-
tions only,2 " to all land use regulations, or most broadly, to all police power
regulations. Seawall seems to take a fairly expansive reading of Nollan by
extending it outside of its original context of exactions and applying it to a
landlord-tenant statute.275 This is significant because it allows for the "sub-
stantial nexus" test created in Nollan to be used in a landlord-tenant case for
the first time.276
Although maintaining the stock of low-cost housing would seem, at first
glance, to further the goal of helping the homeless, the majority in Seawall
looked at the actual, statistical relationship between SRO housing and the
homeless crisis.27 7 This heightened scrutiny is significant because it indicates a
potentially drastic change from the traditionally deferential rational basis test
that has often been applied in all types of economic regulations.27 The Sea-
wall court's broad reading of Nollan could seriously undermine a line of pre-
269. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825.
270. See supra note 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing heightened scrutiny holding of
Nollan).
271. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing Nollan's substantial nexus test).
272. See infra note 277 and accompanying text (Seawall court requiring statistical
relationship).
273. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 1608-09 (stating that if all future regulatory claims are
to be subjected to Nollan's heightened scrutiny standard, the decision's "import is both clear and
startling: Who knows how many land-use regulations, hitherto thought virtually immune from
federal judicial censorship, might be destined for doom at the hands of lower federal courts now
supremely licensed to apply to them an intensified means-ends scrutiny?").
274. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing "exactions").
275. See Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 104-13, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1063-
69, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546-52 (en banc) (citing to and applying Nollan), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
500 (1989).
276. See Sweeney, supra note 192, at 2, col. 5 (suggesting that "the majority in [Seawall] may
be forging a new and more stringent regulatory taking jurisprudence for municipalities and giving
greater latitude to the development community to challenge local land use enactments as regula-
tory takings"),
277. Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 111-13, 542 N.E.2d at 1068-69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
278. This lack of deference was one of the dissent's primary objections to the Seawall majority.
Id. at 121, 542 N.E.2d at 1074, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (stating that,
when challenging economic legislation, "modern substantive due process principles require that
the judiciary give great deference to the [legislative body]").
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cedent which has exhibited an extremely deferential attitude toward land use
regulations.279
The Seawall decision, arguably, takes the lead from Nollan by protecting
substantive property rights.2 80 Moreover, this potential trend may well con-
tinue into the future if Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on property rights
spread.281 The "substantial nexus" test created in Nollan was written by the
then recently appointed Justice Scalia, who has been joined by other conserva-
tive Court members in recent land use cases.282 Because the Supreme Court
decides relatively few land use cases, projecting future decisions is at best
speculative. It would seem, however, that the Supreme Court now has a clear
majority for providing substantive property rights, as evidenced in Nollan.
C. Protecting the Homeless
The Seawall decision is important because, although Local Law No. 9
seemed to be a serious intrusion on a landowner's right of possession and the
related right to exclude others, it was also a regulation that attempted to at-
tack a compelling social problem.282 In that sense, Seawall presented two
countervailing policies: 1) a strong public interest in subsiding the homeless
problem, and 2) an equally strong interest of private landowners in their prop-
erty. By siding with the private landowners, Seawall may be a significant set-
back for special interest and minority groups, such as the homeless, who may
have been the beneficiary of previous land use regulations. 84 After Seawall,
279. See Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 71 N.Y.2d 313, 320, 520
N.E.2d 528, 530, 525 N.Y.S.2d M09, 811-12 (1988) ("modern substantive due process principles
require that the judiciary give great deference to the [legislative body]") (citing Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124 (1977)) (additional citations omitted).
280. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1612-13 (acknowledging that the protection of substantive
property rights through the use of heightened scrutiny was defended by Justice Scalia in Nollan
when he suggested that takings claims, as opposed to typical due process and equal protection
claims that arise in economic or commercial settings, fall into a specially sensitive constitutional
category, much like free speech claims).
281. See Radin, supra note 2, at 1674 (stating that although not explicitly adopting the teach-
ings of neoconservatives like Richard Epstein, Rehnquist leans heavily in that direction and has
implied that market alienability is of constitutional stature).
282. Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. I (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (objecting to rent control ordinance that allegedly would result in the extraction of a public
benefit from landlords).
283. See, e.g., Filer, What We Really Know About the Homeless, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1990,
at 22, col. I (stating that the Department of Housing and Urban Development has estimated the
homeless population at about 350,000, although this is only a ballpark estimate. This estimate,
however, is in direct conflict with the numbers of certain advocacy groups that have made claims
that the true homeless population is much closer to three to four million. Id.).
284. This point, however, is disputed. According to the Wall Street Journal, the correlation
between landlord-tenant statutes and the homeless is murky at best. Filer, What We Really Know
About the Homeless, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1990, at 22, col. 4. The article states:
[W]e know almost nothing about the connection between homelessness and housing
markets. There is no reliable evidence that homelessness is more extensive in cities
with tight housing markets. The assertions that homelessness is linked to rent control
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states that want to protect the homeless may have to raise taxes or find more
creative ways to impose on landowners.
This increase in the protection of property rights is warranted, however, be-
cause the entire public, and not just individual landowners, should bear the
burdens involved with these regulations. As one commentator noted:
the Seawall court is telling us that under the system of laws and justice we
have chosen to ensconce ourselves in, particularly with regard to our core
notions of equality and fairness, that in our legitimate quest to meet and
assist those of us having significantly less fortune and advantage, that we, as
a society, cannot decree a redistribution of property and assets in aid of
those less advantaged by selecting one group of us who is more advantaged
to bare a disproportionate amount of the burden of giving assistance. Per-
haps properly so, the Court has said that the justice of assistance spreads
across our bounty equally not selectively. The burden is all of ours together.
It does not come to'settle solely upon the more bountiful. 85
Landowners are not typically the creators of such societal problems, and it
seems intuitively unfair to impose the costs solely on those landowners. Impos-
ing affirmative duties on particular minorities of landowners to provide hous-
ing to poor and homeless goes far beyond harm prevention; in effect, such
duties force landowners to be charitable. Although the idea of helping the un-
fortunate is noble, such charitable decisions should remain voluntary in a free
society. If government determines that this volunteerism is insufficient to com-
bat the homeless problem, then society should bear the costs of remedying this
crisis, not just the owners of SRO properties.
V. CONCLUSION
The Seawall decision can actually be seen as two distinct decisions because
it proclaims that the creation .of forced tenancies, resulting from Local Law
No. 9, constituted a taking whether analyzed under a physical or regulatory
analysis. Seawall is significant as a physical takings case for declaring that
tenancies coerced by the government constitute a per se physical taking of
property based on the resulting infringement of the right to possess property,
along with the corresponding infringement on the right to exclude others from
the property. Although there is no actual displacement of the owner's posses-
sion, as in Loretto, the forced intrusion of a stranger creates an ouster of the
owner's possessory interest which necessarily amounts to a physical taking.
Seawall is significant as a regulatory takings case for being one of the first
or low vacancy rates are intuitions with little empirical support. We do not know the
role that changes in housing markets, including the replacement of public housing
programs with housing vouchers, stricter building and zoning codes, and the explicit
policies designed to reduce the number of single room occupancy hotels, have played
in creating homelessness.
Id. (emphasis added).
285. Sweeney, supra note 192, at 28, col. 2-3.
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cases to apply the Nollan "substantial nexus" test outside of its original con-
text. The result is that. the Seawall case used heightened scrutiny for the first
time in looking at the relationship between the quantity of single room occu-
pancy housing and the number of homeless in New York City. By scrutinizing
the statistical relationship between single room occupancy housing and the
homeless, the court may have signified a crumbling of the rational basis test in
the area of land use regulations.
While Seawall applied both physical and regulatory takings precedents, the
result under both approaches is that substantive private property rights are
given increased protection from intrusive land use regulations. Although Sea-
wall unfortunately shows that the line between physical and regulatory takings
is as unclear as ever, both areas of the law are at least moving in the same
direction: toward more protection of private landowners' bundle of property
rights. This movement in takings law decreases the previous paradoxical state
of the law where physical takings were per se compensable, even if seemingly
trivial in nature, while substantial regulations on property were often held non-
compensable, if deemed regulatory in nature.
Jason W. Rose
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